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Spatial information is essential for modern forms of analysis; and as a result, 
researchers have increasingly called for geographically-specific microdata.  
Contextual data is one way to safely release this information without identifying 
the location of survey respondents.   Analyzing an array of geography attributes, I 
conduct reidentification experiments for 14,796 simulated datasets to measure the 
likelihood of pinpointing geographic locations under alternative database designs, 
relating to: (1) the spatial scale of standard geographies, as determined by the 
areal size of these administrative units; (2) the scope of study, as determined by 
the identification of division, state, and MSA-status; (3) the number of geography 
attributes provided in a dataset; and (4) and coarseness of these contextual 
measures, as determined by global recoding schema.  Using the “data file” as my 
unit of analysis, the number of geographic units resembling a study location as the 
outcome of interest, and associated experimental traits, I detail the complexity of 
reidentification patterns that emerge when constructing public-use files that 
provide contextual data where two distinct scenarios of intruder search behavior 
are assumed. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Many subjects of contemporary social science lend themselves to an analysis in which 
the individuals under study are placed in their context, particularly a context that can be defined 
spatially, such as a street, block, town, county, or some other geographic unit. Advances in 
computer processing power and in the sophistication of analytical tools have facilitated the 
analysis of large amounts of information, leading to a continuously growing demand for access 
to new sources of data. The scientific precepts of transparency and replication have further 
encouraged investigators to distribute their data so that others can verify and build on published 
findings. Yet a delicate balance must be struck between providing easy access to existing data 
and guaranteeing privacy to subjects who agree to take part in scientific studies (National 
Research Council 2007; VanWey et al. 2005). The problem is especially acute when researchers 
collect information about the geographic location of study participants, as spatial indicators can 
provide unambiguous clues about the identity of a respondent (Gutmann et al. 2009; National 
Research Council 2007; Rushton et al. 2006; Armstrong, Rushton, and Zimmerman, 1999; 
Saalfeld, et. al, 1992).  Consequently investigators have become increasingly interested in 
devising procedures for releasing geographically-rich microdata that protect both the utility of 
the collected information and the privacy of subjects.  
Data producers have found two ways of providing this information, either directly 
identifying the spatial unit or releasing only the characteristics of these respondent locations. 
This paper is concerned with this second case, where the contextualized microdata file consists 
of records for study subjects that include both their personal characteristics (e.g., age of 
respondent) and the attributes of their geographic location  (e.g., proportion of population in 
respondent’s neighborhood that is poor). One reason for providing geographic attributes or 
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contextual data, rather than the identity of the spatial unit, is that doing so makes it more difficult 
to pinpoint where the respondent lives (Armstrong, Rushton, and Zimmerman 1999). As a result, 
intruders must search for a target subject within an enlarged population of individuals virtually 
amassed across geographies resembling one another. But when the combination of contextual 
information about a sampled spatial unit is rare among geographies of that type – then 
identification is more likely, rather than less (Saalfeld, Zayatz, and Hoel 1992).  Hence producers 
must carefully construct measures of geographic attributes (along with the personal 
characteristics of subjects) so as to maintain the confidentiality of respondent locations and their 
personal identities, while at the same time ensuring that the data have the maximum analytic 
value for the broadest user group. 
For this study, I compile nearly 15,000 data files composed of geographic-unit records 
containing a variety of contextual data and measure the likelihood of pinpointing locations under 
alternative database designs, relating to: (1) the spatial scale of standard geographies, as 
determined by the areal size of these administrative units; (2) the scope of study, as determined 
by the identification of division, state, and MSA-status; (3) the number of geography attributes 
provided in a dataset; and (4) and coarseness of these contextual measures, as determined by 
global recoding schema.  Using the “data file” as my unit of analysis, the number of geographic 
units resembling a study location as the outcome of interest, and associated experimental traits, I 
detail the complexity of reidentification patterns that emerge when constructing public-use files 
that provide contextual data where two distinct scenarios of intruder search behavior are 
assumed. 
In the following section (Section 2), I present an overview of how disclosure risk is 
influenced by releasing geographic attributes onto microdata files and the implications for 
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database design. For the remainder of the paper, I present my study’s methodology (Section 3), 
the results of my analyses (Section 4), and my conclusions (Section 5). 
 
2.  Disclosure Risk and the Design of Contextualized Microdata 
Three studies have followed the practice of adding contextual data to their analytical 
files. In producing their public-use files for their Residential Energy Consumption Survey, the 
Energy Information Administration perturbed temperature data to mask the location of weather 
stations and nearby sampled households (Energy Information Administration 2001). In a study of 
discrepancies between official votes and exit polls in the 2004 presidential election, official 
tallies of the proportion of Kerry votes were blurred for a sample of Ohio precincts, thereby 
concealing the identity of these controversial voter locations (Kyle et al. 2007). Lastly, Franconi 
and Stander (2002) obscured the location of a sample of enterprises by assigning them to one of 
two regions with distinct contextual characteristics, as revealed by a principal components 
analysis of the geographic attributes for eight Italian territorial units. Because their populations 
are either particularly conspicuous or geographically constrained, all of these studies utilize 
perturbative masking techniques in the creation of a single geographic attribute for release.  
While these applications are insightful, more research is needed to comprehensively 
assess disclosure risk as it varies with different design elements of contextualized microdata. As 
described by Skinner (2007), research assessing identity disclosure may be grouped into two 
bodies, that of “Population Unique” studies and “Reidentification Probabilities” (Skinner and 
Holmes 1998). Playing a central role or laying the foundation of different anonymity factors, one 
important component of disclosure risk is shared by both approaches: the number of units in the 
population resembling those drawn into a study. Both bodies of research assume that the 
geographic location of this population is directly known. But when contextual data are released 
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instead, two such frequency components of disclosure risk must be considered that are based on 
nested populations. Second-level populations of geographic locations bounded by the scope of 
study, as well as first-level populations of individuals (i.e., persons or establishments) 
encompassed within these higher-order units, jointly influence the likelihood that respondents are 
reidentified.  
Data producers may reduce the likelihood of respondents being correctly reidentified by 
fostering the aggregation of first-level populations across locations having similar contextual 
characteristics. Hence my study’s outcome of interest is the degree to which contextual data 
extends the intruder search across disparate locations and their populations. I then discuss the 
decisions involved in creating measures of geography attributes that are both anonymizing and of 
high analytic value, where the same factors determining disclosure risk also influence the utility 
of information.  
 
2. a.  Measurement and Determinants of Disclosure Risk 
Several aspects of study design have serious implications for the disclosure of respondent 
identities. Studies that collect an abundance of detailed information (e.g., longitudinal data, 
social networks), whose research subjects are drawn from a small or otherwise exceptionally 
visible population, or that are geographically specific are often highly risky. For a dataset that 
identifies the geographic location of respondents (e.g., county name), the likelihood of correctly 
reidentifying the target respondent is then a function of the number of individuals (e.g., persons, 
establishments) in the known area’s population having similar identifying personal attributes or 
individual keys (e.g., gender, number of employees). Given the chosen subjects of a study 
characterized by a particular set of individual keys, the number of look-alike individuals (or 
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twins) grows with the size of populations bounded within geographic units (Greenberg and 
Voshell 1990; Zayatz 1991). Therefore when the land area of known geographies is expanded, or 
when their spatial scale is increased, it becomes more difficult to reidentify respondents drawn 
from the field’s enlarged population.  
Instead of releasing identifiers for sufficiently large geographies, producers may choose 
to release the attributes of second-level units. Contextual measures can be either constructed for 
standard geographic units that surround sets of individuals, or created for a spatial window 
uniquely assembled around each subject. Saafeld, Zayatz, and Hoel (1992) argue that windowed 
contexts make the reidentification of locations much more difficult, while standard contexts pose 
an insurmountable amount of disclosure risk since these geographies are far more limited in 
number and well-known. Given the abundance of spatial information that can be easily attached 
to microdata and the need for more confirmatory research, I have chosen to assess contextual 
data derived from standard geographies. 
When microdata contain the attributes of standard geographies (i.e., geographic keys), an 
intruder must consider all locations in the population sharing the same contextual characteristics 
as surveyed locations, defined as look-alike geographies. As with populations of individuals, the 
number of look-alike geographies found in these higher-order populations determines the 
likelihood of pinpointing a surveyed location. But in contrast to first-level populations, the 
spatial scale of geographies underlying contextual measures is negatively associated with the 
number of look-alike geographies.  Large scale localities carve up finite space into expansive 
land areas, resulting in a geographic population with few members.  However small scale 
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Reflecting the two-fold risk dimension of the areal size of geographies, large-scale 
contextual measures foster the accumulation of look-alike individuals as indicated by the 
dramatic growth in the search population with a one-unit increase in look-alike geographies. In 
contrast, considerably more small-scale geographies are required to gather the same number of 
look-alike individuals. Therefore the importance of the number of look-alike geographies – for 
offsetting disclosure risk from each unit’s small population – varies with the spatial scale of 
contextual measures.  
 
F =  L   *  W S  ( 1 ) 
            n 
L =    1     ∑  ( Y J | j  *  P j )  ( 2 ) 
    n     J=1 
 
P j =  f ( S, G, K, M )  ( 3 ) 
Where:  
 
F   = Extension of full intruder search with the release of “contextual” attributes,  
  through the decline in “pinpointed-respondent” probabilities 
W S   = Spatial scale weight, benchmarked to average size of human populations in  
   U. S. counties 
L   = Extension of limited intruder search with the release of “contextual” attributes, 
   through the decline in “pinpointed-location” probabilities 
Y J | j  = Sampled geographic unit ( J ) has combination of “contextual” attributes ( j ) 
P j  = Population counts of geographies having combination of “contextual” attributes ( j ) 
S  = Spatial scale of geographies 
G  =  Scope of study determined by identified geography 
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K  =  Number of geography attributes 
M  =  Measurement coarseness of geography attributes   
 
Identity disclosure is driven by the number of look-alike geographies in two ways that 
depend on intruder search behaviors. When costs are sufficiently high, intruders are likely to 
conduct a limited search by looking for respondents within a subset of all possible locations. As 
a result, disclosure risk is primarily a function of the proportion of look-alike geographies that 
are likely explored. Utilizing data from studies that directly identify the spatial units where 
respondents live, intruders have a 100% chance of perusing surveyed locations. This pinpointed-
location probability declines at a consistent rate with a one-unit increase in the number of look-
alike geographies, regardless of their spatial scale. Representing the denominator for this 
probability, the degree to which contextual data extends a limited intruder search is indicated by 
the average population count of look-alike geographies for respondent locations (i.e., L).  
I estimate this risk component by tallying the number of counties, tracts, and blockgroups 
within the geographic population that resemble my sampled locations (i.e., P j ). The distribution 
of contextual variables characterizing surveyed geographies (i.e., Y J | j ) is determined by my 
experiment’s sampling methodology. Using simple combinations of contextual variables derived 
from perfectly accurate information, the number of look-alike geographies within the population 
depends on four characteristics of a dataset: the spatial scale of context (S), geographic 
identifiers (G), the number of contextual variables (K), and the coarseness of their measures (M). 
A conservative assessment of risk assumes that intruders will conduct a full search by 
extensively looking for a respondent within all pertinent geographies and their populations, 
setting the pinpointed-location probability back to 100%. As a result, disclosure risk then 
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becomes a function of the number of look-alike individuals compiled across all look-alike 
geographies. The rate at which look-alike geographies contribute to this pinpointed-respondent 
probability depends on the concentration of lower-level populations within the spatial unit and 
systematically varies with their spatial scale. Facilitating comparisons between database designs, 
I weight the average number of look-alike geographies (i.e., L) by their ability to accumulate 
first-level populations (i.e., W S) as benchmarked to a common population-size standard. By 
standardizing the number of look-alike geographies, my second outcome measure then indicates 
the degree to which contextual data extends the full intruder search as measured by the 
multiplicative factor (i.e., F) associated with the size of first-level populations within the 
benchmarking area.  
In creating the above multiplier F, I allow for the absolute size of study populations to 
vary since researchers ponder a variety of subjects within their spatial context. Furthermore, in 
constructing the weight W S , I assume that the spatial distribution of specialized human and 
establishment populations mirror that of the general human population. There are dramatic 
differences in the size of human populations within U.S. counties, tracts, and blockgroups, with 
an average of 89,596; 4,318; and 1,352 persons (respectively). Weighing the original second-
level population counts by the relative size of first-level populations, I multiply tract and 
blockgroup values by 0.0482 and 0.0151 respectively, such that these estimates are benchmarked 
to county-level counts (i.e., 4,318 and 1,352 divided by 89,596).  
 
2. b.  Decisions Involved in Creating Safe and Useful Contextual Data 
When designing a dataset, the producer seeks to release as much information as possible 
while ensuring that subjects face minimal disclosure risk.  After choosing the mode of 
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distributing data files to the user community and considering associated intruder behavior, he 
must first define what constitutes anonymity for survey respondents by selecting the minimal 
probability of correct reidentification. Given this definition of risk, he estimates the likelihood of 
subjects being reidentified for a variety of database configurations. The producer then makes a 
wish list of data utility characteristics by prioritizing (1) the geographic scope of study or the 
release of geographic identifiers, (2) the scale of contextual variables, (3) the number of these 
geography attributes, and (4) their measurement detail. Subsequent decisions seeking to 
minimize risk can then be guided by these priorities. 
Setting the stage for the intruder search, the designated geographic area of study is 
usually bounded within nation-states and is further restricted by the direct identification of 
regions or by the initial confinement to a particular area (e.g., small-area studies). If geographic 
attributes can adequately capture important spatial determinants, contextual information is a 
likely alternative to releasing of direct geographic identifiers. In turn, choosing the scale of 
geographic attributes is of paramount concern when compiling contextual information for 
release. This decision depends on the most likely research questions to be answered with the data 
file and the nature of spatial processes to be studied. Producers must carefully consider whether a 
particular scale of context may be too large of an aggregation, smoothing over environmental 
patterns better captured by smaller geographies.  
While small-scale contexts may provide the most analytically useful information, a 
higher number of look-alike geographies is required to offset risk from their lesser populations. 
Small geographic units, which are large in number, offer more opportunities to locate look-alike 
units or matches. Hence the ability to pinpoint geographic units declines with their areal size, 
given the high probability of finding multiple matches.  However the anonymity benefits of a 
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relatively large number of potential matches is offset by another statistical artifact.  Because 
space is delineated into units that are relatively small in area, large in number, and 
heterogeneous, small-scale locations exhibit considerably more variation in contextual 
characteristics, increasing the chance of identifying unique contexts. Bringing together these 
factors, the selection of contextual scale requires complex decisions that carefully consider 
intruder behavior. 
Data producers can further influence the accumulation of look-alike geographies (and 
individuals therein) by carefully selecting the number and measurement detail of contextual 
variables. The analytical utility of data generally increases with these design elements. However 
locations are generally more easily reidentified in datasets with relatively large numbers of 
geographic attributes. The amount of risk resulting from these keys depends on the coarseness of 
their measurement.  
To reduce disclosure risk in public-use microdata files, agencies often only apply 
nonperturbative methods in order to maintain the statistical properties of the original data, thus 
maximizing its utility for widely disparate and largely unknown applications (Interagency 
Confidentiality and Data Access Group 1999; Subcommittee on Disclosure Limitation 
Methodology 2005; Zayatz 2005).  Consequently two important techniques of statistical 
disclosure control should be considered, namely global recoding and local suppression (DeWaal 
and Willenborg 1995, 1996).  Aggregating continuous measures into various levels of 
coarseness, utilizing global recoding schema, decreases the likelihood that locations are 
reidentified.  But for geographic units that remain easily pinpointed, their contextual 
characteristics are not to be released on a microdata file and are locally suppressed.  
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Synthetic data techniques can then be used to construct contextual information that 
replaces a particular missing value or to formulate a completely new set of measures. Fewer 
measurement categories and high suppression rates increase the amount of information lost, 
while large amounts of ascribed data may distort analyses. Hence a producer needs to consider 
how data utility varies with these methods and whether a group of geographic units is 
particularly affected by these aberrations.  
 
3.  Assessing Disclosure Risk of Masked Contextual Data  
Informing the above decision-making process, I conduct experiments to assess the 
amount of disclosure risk associated with a dataset’s contextual data (Domingo-Ferrer and Torra, 
2001a).  In doing so, I followed seven methodological steps: 
• draw a sample of contextual variable sets; 
• construct test datasets that vary in spatial scale of contextual measures, identified 
geography, number of keys, and masking method, holding constant sample of base 
variable sets; 
• identify a set of geographic units associated with a single synthetic sample of study 
subjects; 
• construct microdata files composed of sampled locations, attaching test datasets of 
contextual data to these geographic-level records; 
• reidentify a set of sampled locations, using available geographic identifiers and 
contextual data for counties, tracts, and blockgroups; 
• calculate two measures of disclosure risk components for each test microdata file; and 
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• estimate two measures of disclosure risk components for all possible datasets (i.e., full 
population of base variable sets).   
 
3. a.  Sources, Measures, and Sampled Sets of Contextual Variables 
My sources of contextual data are summary files tabulated from the 2000 U.S. Census of 
Population and Housing (U.S. Department of Commerce 2000a, 2000b, 2000c).  These summary 
files are prominent public-use databases within the social sciences, providing a diversity of 
measures and a range of geographic detail. Contextual data are compiled from published 
tabulations for all blockgroups, tracts, and counties in the United States.  
To identify which measures would be of most interest to researchers, I draw on the 
sociological literature on stratification, residential segregation and mobility, and labor markets. I 
limit my test datasets to those having subsets of the seventeen demographic concepts listed in my 
Appendix Table A-2.  
The conceptual content of datasets varies with (1) the number of contextual variables 
(i.e., k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and (2) which contextual variables are included in the sets. All possible sets 
of contextual variables are constructed for those containing one, two, three, four, and five 
concepts (N k = 17; 136; 680; 2,380; 6,188; respectively). I compile datasets – holding constant a 
specific contextual variable set – by varying its spatial scale, identified geography, and masking 
technique.  Consequently, I can better clarify risk factors associated with spatial scale and 
geographic relationships and avoid confounding my results with varying sub-domains. 
Relationships between variables within a dataset have implications for reidentification 
and vary with the geographic scale of the measures.  Large amounts of variation within measures 
(i.e., wide range of values) increase the likelihood of identifying uniques and, therefore, 
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disclosure risk. However large amounts of collinearity among measures may allow producers to 
release more variables within a dataset without drastically increasing disclosure risk.  To assure 
an unbiased selection of measures that are representative of the degrees of variance and 
collinearity among all possible datasets, I sample 137 sets of contextual variables composed of 
one to five concepts.  All seventeen variable sets with a single concept are included in my study.  
Thirty datasets are randomly sampled from each stratum of the multiple-concept variable sets.  I 
expect that my results will be robust whether my experiment is composed of 30 or 300 variables 
sets since the statistical properties of contextual information packages remain fairly constant (see 
Appendix Table 1-A for further details).  
 
3. b.  Experimental Traits 
Datasets (C b,s,g,m) are varied along the [B x S x G x M] matrix of: (1) variable sets (b = 1 
to 137, described above); (2) spatial scales of contextual data (s = 1, 2, 3 = counties, tracts, 
blockgroups); (3) identified geographies (g = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 = none, population density, division, 
state, population density and division, population density and state); and (4) masking techniques 
(m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 = 1%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and Top and Bottom-25% categories). 
Consequently, 14,796 datasets (= 137 x 3 x 6 x 6) are compiled and assessed.   
Illustrating this nomenclature, two datasets are compiled using one of the sampled sets 
consisting of five contextual variables (b=137): (1) % Persons, Non-Hispanic White; (2) % 
Persons, Foreign-Born; (3) % Households, Receiving Public Assistance; (4) % Housing Units, 
Owner-Occupied; and (5) % Civilian Labor Force, Unemployed.  Test dataset (C 137,1,1,1) 
contains these five contextual variables measured at the county-level (s=1) without any 
geographic identifiers (g=1), masked into 1% categories (m=1).  In comparison, test dataset (C 
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137,3,3,3) contains these five contextual variables measured at the blockgroup-level (s=3) along 
with the identification of division (g=3), masked into 5% categories (m=3).1 
Given these contextual variable sets, I then constrain my matching process by geographic 
identifiers released in the dataset.  A dataset can directly identify the state and region of 
respondent locations, where U.S. Census geographic divisions categorize states into seven 
regional groups of (1) New England, (2) Middle Atlantic, (3) East North Central, (4) West North 
Central, (5) South Atlantic, (6) East South Central, (7) West South Central, (8) Mountain, and (9) 
Pacific.   
The population density of unidentified geographies is a contextual variable that also 
broadly confines the scope of study. Population density is defined by three categories of MSA-
status: (1) MSA 1-million or more, (2) MSA less than 1-million, and (3) Non-MSA (Sources: 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2002, 2006a, 2006b). Measured at the county-level, these data are also used 
to characterize the MSA-status of tracts and blockgroups. Given its general analytical appeal, I 
consider MSA-status as a “pseudo” direct geographic identifier and analyze how this element 
determines risk separately from and jointly with other contextual variables.  
Finally I systematically vary the amount of measurement detail across my experimental 
datasets; thereby assessing how these risk components fluctuate with global recoding schema.  
Geographic units are considered outliers when their attributes place them within the top and 
                                            
1  Presented in Appendix Table A-2, equal proportions of datasets across categories of spatial 
scale, geographic identifiers, and masking techniques reflect my experimental design. However, 
the proportions of datasets across categories of the number and conceptual composition of 
contextual variables reflect the random sampling of variables set, stratified by the number of 
keys (i.e., including all 17 sets with 1 key; including 30 sets each with 2, 3, 4, and 5 keys). Every 
conceptual domain is represented in my test datasets. Fifteen of the seventeen concepts were 
included in 15 to 24% of the datasets.  However, “% Persons, Non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific 
Islander” was least likely to be represented (7% of datasets); while “% Persons, Non-Hispanic 
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bottom 0.5% of their population’s distribution (Zayatz, 2005), defined by each dataset’s 
identified geography. These extreme attribute values typically lead to unique geographies (i.e., 
population count equal to “1”), requiring that a value representing the upper or lower bound of 
the distribution be assigned. After top-coding and bottom-coding my continuous variables to 
conceal outliers, I recode contextual measures into six grades of coarseness (i.e., 1%, 5%, 10%, 
15%, 20%, and Top and Bottom-25% categories).  Contextual variables are recoded into 
aggregated categories based on their absolute values (i.e., absolute recoding).  For example, let 
us consider a county having 72% of its population that is non-Hispanic White.  Coarsening the 
measure into 10%-categories, the county would be characterized as having an absolute value that 
falls between 70% and 80%.2 
 
[Exhibit 1 Here] 
                                            
2  I conduct another set of simulations analyzing contextual measures that are coarsened based 
on their percentile distribution (i.e., percentile recoding).  Twenty percent of all counties have at 
most 66% of their population being non-Hispanic White (i.e., 20th percentile at 66.14%); while 
thirty percent of all counties have at most 76% of their population being non-Hispanic White 
(i.e., 30th percentile at 76.11%).  Coarsening the measure into deciles categories, my exemplar 
county – having 72% of its population being non-Hispanic White – would be characterized as 
falling between 20th and 30th percentiles (i.e., the third decile).   
 
 As illustrated in Appendix Table A-4, disclosure risk is heightened considerably by this 
global recoding approach.  Counties having a rare characteristic – those with an outlying value at 
the tails of a contextual variable’s continuous probability distribution – have a larger number of 
look-alike geographies with percentile coarsening.  However, counties sharing a relatively 
common characteristic – those within the middle of the distribution – have a smaller number of 
look-alikes with percentile coarsening.  
 
 Building upon my previous example, let us consider my exemplar county which is one 
among a population of 3,141.  With absolute recoding, this county has approximately 346 
matches with values between 70% and 80%.   With percentile recoding, there are 315 matches 
with values between 66.14% and 76.11%.  In turn, percentile recoding automatically sets an 
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3. c.  Sampled Locations 
Represented in the 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 2000a), a stratified sample of blocks is drawn to reflect the areal distribution of the 
U.S. population across states. I have chosen the block as my sampling unit because it most 
closely approximates the residential location of our theoretically ideal sample of individual study 
subjects (i.e., persons). Being the foundational spatial unit from which all geographies are built 
upon, blocks also pinpoint various contexts to a single location. In turn, tabulations from 
identified counties, tracts, and blockgroups, which overlap with my sampled blocks, are included 
in my study as contextual data. These contextual data are then represented in a dataset of location 
records.   
Fifty-one state-specific block samples (including the District of Columbia) are drawn 
with probability-proportional-to-size without replacement (PPS).  Each block within a state has a 
probability of selection that is proportional to its population density, defined as the total number 
of persons per square meter of block area.  Presented in Appendix Table A-3, 11,562 blocks are 
sampled, representing 11,562 synthetic persons dispersed across approximately 5% of all 
blockgroups, 14% of all tracts, and 57% of all counties in the U.S.  Further details about my 
sampling methodology and construction of weights are available upon request.  
 
3. d.  Generalized Estimates of Risk Components 
As detailed in Section 2.a., the foundation of my measures of disclosure risk components 
(i.e., F and L) is the number of geographies within a second-level population sharing a particular 
set of contextual characteristics (i.e., P j ). These estimates are derived from a single sample of 
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locations associated with a survey of respondents (i.e., Y J | j), instead of drawing separate 
samples of counties, tracts, and blockgroups.  
Since geographic attributes of surveyed locations are not perturbed, identifying matches 
is exact. Consequently I simply count the number of geographic units in the population file 
sharing the same attributes as units found in a test database, as determined by selected design 
elements (Winkler 2004). Analyzing metadata characterizing my sample of 14,796 datasets (see 
Appendix Table A-4 for further details), I produce approximations of my two outcome measures 
that are generalized to all possible collections.  In doing so, I provide point and interval estimates 
of the degree to which limited and full intruder search efforts are extended with contextual data 
for 540 dataset typologies defined by my study’s experimental traits (i.e., S x G x K x M = 3 x 6 
x 5 x 6).  
 
4.  Presentation of Results  
In turn I present estimates of these risk components in matrices that represent a tool for 
creating contextualized microdata. Encapsulating the complexity of results, I also produce a 
series of summary figures and provide a specific example of how this information may be 
integrated into the design of datasets. These experimental findings directly apply only to studies 
within the U.S. context, as the construction of such geographies in other countries is very 
different. 
 
4. a.  Tool for Designing Contextual Data 
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In Tables 1 and 2, I present the average unstandardized and standardized number of look-
alike geographic units for each dataset typology. 3 I also present the lower bound of these 
estimates in that the largest, probable amount of risk is also of concern when designing public-
use datasets.  These tables are organized so that the reader can easily assess patterns of risk.  
Dividing the table into three pages, each page shows estimates for datasets with different spatial 
scales of contextual data.  Each page is further divided into six panels, where each panel displays 
information for datasets with varying geographic identifiers.  Within each panel, predicted values 
are presented for datasets with one to five contextual variables (across columns) that vary in the 
coarseness of their measurement (within rows).  Hence, within each page, risk tends to increase 
as one reads from left-to-right and from top-to-bottom.4 
 
[ Tables 1 and 2 ] 
 
                                            
3   Confidence intervals for extreme measurement values tend to be narrower than those for 
moderate values.  Since estimates are adjusted to account for the complex survey design of 
sampled variables sets, this pattern does not reflect bias introduced from heteroskedasticity; 
rather it arises from a confluence of matching inefficiencies in my matching algorithm.  It is easy 
to predict that the number of look-alike geographies will be close to “1” when we have a large 
number of fine-grained contextual data that characterize a relatively finite geographic area.  But 
it becomes more difficult to predict these outcomes (with as much precision) when 
reidentification depends upon fewer, coarsely-grained measures that characterize a larger 
population of potential matches.  Consequently, confidence intervals tend to be the narrowest at 
the extremes and widen across more moderate levels of my risk components.  This variation 
should be considered when using this study’s results for designing datasets. 
 
4  For those wishing to fine-tune results presented in Supplemental Table 2, Supplemental 
Table 1’s estimates can be associated with alternative spatial scale weights that are constructed 
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4. b.  Likelihood of Pinpointing Sampled Locations in a Limited Intruder Search  
Summarizing Table 1 results, the spatial scale of contexts and the scope of study 
dramatically influence the chance of pinpointing respondent locations when conducting a limited 
search. For contexts characterized by 1 to 5 attributes at 6 coarseness-levels, there is a 1-in-1,082 
average chance of correctly selecting a surveyed county from those across the nation. Dividing 
space among larger sets of tracts and blockgroups, uncertainty drops to less than a tenth of this 
amount (i.e., 46,709 and 15,001 look-alike blockgroups and tracts across the nation).  
Placing these geographic units into searchable subsets, risk dramatically rises again when 
the scope of study is constrained. For instance, collections identifying the state and MSA-status 
have pinpointed-location probabilities whose magnitudes are over 50 times that of national 
databases (i.e., 20, 200, and 565 look-alike counties, tracts, and blockgroups). Besides 
determining the absolute number of look-alike units (i.e., the denominator of pinpointed-location 
probability), the scope of study also influences whether all units are searched (i.e., the numerator 
of this probability). If we assume that the ease of compiling identifying information is spatially 
clustered, search costs should be relatively lower for finite areas, increasing the likelihood of an 
extensive exploration that heightens disclosure risk.  
However little is known about factors that shape intruder behaviors; and, therefore, a 
more conservative assessment of risk is warranted. Assuming that all look-alike geographies will 
be searched, it then becomes necessary to assess whether the aggregation of first-level 
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4. c.  Likelihood of Pinpointing Respondents in a Full Intruder Search  
For all spatial scales of context, the uncertainty associated with a full-search generally 
declines with the release of any direct geographic identifier. Summarizing Table 2 results in 
Figures 1 to 4, an average of 1,082; 723; and 705 standardized look-alike counties are identified 
when national databases release between 1 to 5 geographic attributes at 6 coarseness-levels of 
county-, tract-, and blockgroup-level contexts (respectively). Illustrated in Figure 1, knowledge 
of the population density (i.e., MSA-status) of contexts typically reduces the size of aggregated 
populations by 48, 62, and 63% (across spatial scales). Disclosure risk continues to rise 
dramatically with the release of division only, resulting in an 85 to 88% reduction in 
standardized look-alike counties. As compared to national datasets, the ability to aggregate 
anonymizing individuals falls by 99% when the state and population density of surveyed 
locations is known. While the protection offered by contextual data has dwindled significantly, 
these spatially constrained collections can still compile first-level populations across an average 
of 9, 10, or 20 standardized geographies (for blockgroup-, tract-, and county-level contexts, 
respectively). However these aggregation rates depend on the number and coarseness of 
contextual measures as well as the absolute size of individual populations. 
 
[Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4] 
 
Looking at Figures 2 and 3, the amount of risk associated with contextual information 
generally increases with the number of geography keys and their measurement detail.  The 
largest increase in risk occurs with the addition of a second attribute, for contexts of any spatial 
scale across all scopes of study (Figure 2), with a 32% reduction in the aggregation of individual 
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populations from county-level contextual data and an even more pronounced decline of 44% for 
tract- and blockgroup-level contexts. Releasing a third and a fourth attribute also decreases 
uncertainty but at a moderate rate (13 to 17% decrements); while a fifth key has relatively little 
effect on risk (7% decrement). 
Seeking to offset risk associated with the number of contextual keys, we see from Figure 
3 that the amount of uncertainty rises by 362 to 467% when the most detailed measures 
represented in 1%-categories are collapsed into 5%-categories. With an 80% reduction in the 
number of measurement categories (i.e., from 100 to 20 metric spaces), collections are able to 
achieve an average of 82 to 156 standardized counties. For the remaining recoding schemes, the 
aggregation of first-level populations follows a consistent increasing pattern, mirroring the fall in 
measurement detail. By lowering the number of measurement categories from 100 to 10, 7, 5 and 
3, uncertainty rises by approximately 800; 1,100; 1,400; and 1,900% (respectively). 
 
4. c.  Example of Decision-Making Process 
The U.S. Census Bureau has initiated dissemination practices that allow for highly 
populated locations to be identified on microdata files (Cox et al. 1986; U.S. Census Bureau 
2001, 2003b). The foundation of these guidelines is the population-size threshold that indicates: 
the minimal size of a population required to produce a sufficiently small number of individuals 
with unique characteristics (within said population) who are subsequently drawn into a survey 
(Greenberg and Voshell 1990; Zayatz 1991). For instance, the Census Bureau has found that risk 
falls to a negligible level when there are 100,000 or more persons in the population. As a result, 
the Current Population Survey has been allowed to directly identify such densely populated 
counties in their public-use files. 
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But let us consider a hypothetical cross-sectional survey with a similar set of personal 
identifiers and sampling rate, whose study population is composed of persons aged 65 years and 
over (rather than the civilian non-institutional population 15 years of age and older).5 Based on 
the 2000 decennial census, an average of 11,140 persons from this specialized population resides 
within a county. Reflecting upon the above rule-of-thumb as applied to a full intruder search, it 
would require approximately 9 standard look-alike counties (representing 186 tracts or 595 
blockgroups) to reach 100,000 members of this aged population, thereby ensuring the 
confidentiality for approximately 17,500 respondents. 
Developing a microdata file for this study population that contains blockgroup-level 
contextual data, I review Table 2 to identify design elements that are likely to yield a sufficient 
amount of uncertainty. Ideally I would like to release four or five contextual variables as well as 
a geographic identifier; therefore I consider the trade-offs in risk with identifying division alone, 
division and population density, and state alone. Furthermore I investigate how risk will be offset 
by aggregating my measures into 10%-, 15%- and 20%- categories. 
Presented in Figure 4, three optimal designs are likely to produce the 9 standard counties 
required to meet our population-size threshold: (1) division, 5-keys, 10%-categories; (2) division 
and population density, 5-keys, 15%-categories; and (3) state, 4-keys, 20%-categories.  The final 
choice among these schemes ultimately hinges on the analytical value of the measures and the 
scientific relevance of the contextual content. 
 
                                            
5  Typically the Current Population Survey samples roughly 50,000 households. With 2000 
census counts of 105,480,101 households, this translates into an approximate coverage (or 
sampling) rate of 0.000474. 
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5.  Conclusions 
This research assesses on how different design elements of contextual information 
influence a study’s geographic specificity and, consequently, its level of disclosure risk. Because 
this is an analysis of spatial units defined and characterized by United States’ administrative 
systems and its population, results can be directly applied to U.S. studies. The lessons learned 
may also be of use to a much wider audience since the fundamental components of disclosure 
risk of contextualized microdata (based on standard units) are abstractions that can be 
empirically characterized and modeled. The size of first- and second- level populations, coupled 
with measures summarizing distributions of their identifying characteristics, are important 
variables that can predict risk for a variety of individuals nested within a variety of 
environments. But as I describe below, there are contingencies not represented in my 
experimental design that indicate the need for further research. 
First of all, my study’s synthetic set of respondents is (in essence) a random sample of 
persons scattered across each of the U.S. states, reflecting the areal distribution of the population. 
This approach provides a more comprehensive sample of contexts and enhances the robustness 
of my estimates. While appropriate for this study, my sampling methodology does not reflect 
how survey data is typically collected.  In reality, surveys are likely to have a clustered design 
that result in public-use data files containing indicators of the strata and clusters from which 
respondents are drawn. Although my current study does not directly consider these 
methodological indicators, a nationally representative two-stage cluster design is closely akin to 
a study that has released: (1) state identifiers, representing strata; (2) MSA-status, representing 
the first cluster; and (3) another geographic attribute characterizing the area from which a second 
cluster is drawn from (e.g., high- and low-income schools). 
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While these strata and clusters may remain unnamed, disclosure risk may be heightened 
by estimating the likelihood that a sampled cluster matches a particular set of geographies in the 
population as a function of contextual keys. The search for look-alike geographies can then be 
limited to those within newly pinpointed clusters. The accuracy of these posterior probabilities 
depends on the degree to which primary sampling units (PSU) and contexts overlap or are 
bounded within one another. 
The spatial intersection between PSUs and selected contexts also increases risk by 
limiting the aggregation of first-level populations. Sampling units may take the form of blended 
geographies, where respondents are drawn across administrative units. Subtracting overlapping 
areas, slivers of geography can emerge that encompass a small subset of the population. 
Assessing risk in terms of person-counts, Duke-Williams and Rees’ (1998) found that these 
geographic slivers significantly increased the chances of pinpointing respondents residing within 
extemporaneous boundaries. Therefore, if PSUs do not have exactly the same contexts, a 
clustered sampling design may fail to aggregate a sufficient number of individuals with shared 
personal and contextual characteristics, regardless of the number of look-alike geographies. 
Besides assessing how risk is shaped by a study’s sampling methodology, it is also 
important to consider other types of contextual variables. The current study analyzes a sample of 
contextual variable sets, where all keys share the same level of coarseness. While these 
simplifications were necessary for the initial stages of this work, further research needs to be 
conducted to (1) closely study how specific contextual measures (e.g. % persons, in-poverty) 
shape disclosure risk; (2) identify more optimal recoding schemes; and (3) quantify the utility of 
masked contextual data by measuring amounts of information lost and suppression bias (e.g., 
Domingo-Ferrer and Torra, 2001a and 2001b; Raghunathan, et. al. 2003; Winkler 2004).  
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Furthermore this study only considers census-based contextual variables that distinguish 
standard geographic-units independently of one other. However geographic attributes may also 
be spatially or temporally linked, consisting of: (1) a single location characterized by contextual 
variables of differing spatial scales; (2) a single respondent associated with two locations 
characterized by contextual variables; and (3) a single location characterized by contextual 
variables gathered at multiple points in time. These dependencies appreciably cap the number of 
look-alike geographies as compared to datasets having the same number of independent 
geographic attributes.  
Producers may also want to release non-census based contextual variables, such as 
distance of respondent’s home from a river or the average rainfall of the immediate area, along 
with contextual measures for standard spatial units.  Since both kinds of information can be 
mapped onto the same spatial surface, an intruder’s search can be further narrowed to 
geographies that share all of these demographic, topological, and climatic characteristics.  
Although I have only discussed the role of geographic attributes, respondent 
characteristics may also be used to pinpoint surveyed locations. A new set of approximated 
contextual measures can be derived from the personal characteristics of sampled individuals 
within shared contexts. As an example of such an indicator, let us consider respondents living in 
unidentified counties with 50 to 59% its population in-poverty, where we calculate the 
proportion of these sampled persons who are 18 years of age. The accuracy of these 
supplemental keys and their subsequent contributions to the reidentification process is enhanced 
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[ Exhibit 1 ] 
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Table 1.  Average Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and Experimental Traits 
of Geography Attributes 
 County Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI
          
National (None)        
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 2,782 (2,782) 2,383 (2,231) 2,224 (2,058) 1,761 (1,597) 1,607 (1,418)
  20%-Categories 2,485 (2,485) 1,867 (1,675) 1,551 (1,331) 1,143 (988) 933 (787)
  15%-Categories 2,218 (2,218) 1,494 (1,279) 1,163 (933) 714 (590) 516 (413)
  10%-Categories 1,921 (1,921) 1,177 (966) 810 (612) 435 (354) 296 (221)
  5%-Categories 1,397 (1,397) 592 (448) 325 (206) 119 (86) 68 (45)
  1%-Categories 408 (408) 54 (36) 15 (5) 2 (2) 1 (1)
                   
Population Density                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 1,406 (1,406) 1,226 (1,158) 1,135 (1,056) 923 (848) 858 (771)
  20%-Categories 1,262 (1,262) 971 (875) 805 (690) 619 (533) 512 (430)
  15%-Categories 1,133 (1,133) 784 (679) 613 (496) 396 (330) 289 (234)
  10%-Categories 987 (987) 620 (517) 432 (331) 251 (205) 174 (133)
  5%-Categories 731 (731) 323 (249) 183 (117) 74 (53) 43 (29)
  1%-Categories 237 (237) 33 (22) 10 (3) 2 (1) 1 (1)
                   
Division                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 390 (390) 341 (323) 320 (300) 265 (244) 243 (218)
  20%-Categories 353 (353) 278 (253) 235 (206) 183 (161) 156 (135)
  15%-Categories 320 (320) 229 (201) 182 (151) 124 (105) 96 (80)
  10%-Categories 282 (282) 185 (156) 132 (103) 82 (68) 60 (47)
  5%-Categories 211 (211) 102 (79) 59 (40) 26 (19) 17 (12)
  1%-Categories 67 (67) 12 (8) 4 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1)
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Table 1 (cont.).  Average Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and Experimental 
Traits of Geography Attributes 
 County Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI
          
Division & Pop.Dens.                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 217 (217) 194 (185) 181 (170) 155 (144) 145 (132)
  20%-Categories 198 (198) 161 (148) 137 (120) 112 (99) 98 (85)
  15%-Categories 181 (181) 135 (120) 108 (91) 78 (67) 62 (52)
  10%-Categories 161 (161) 110 (94) 80 (64) 54 (45) 41 (32)
  5%-Categories 122 (122) 62 (50) 38 (26) 18 (14) 12 (9)
  1%-Categories 43 (43) 8 (6) 3 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1)
                   
State                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 78 (78) 69 (65) 65 (62) 55 (51) 51 (46)
  20%-Categories 71 (71) 57 (52) 49 (43) 39 (35) 33 (29)
  15%-Categories 65 (65) 47 (42) 38 (32) 27 (23) 22 (18)
  10%-Categories 57 (57) 38 (33) 28 (23) 18 (15) 14 (11)
  5%-Categories 43 (43) 22 (18) 13 (10) 7 (5) 5 (4)
  1%-Categories 15 (15) 3 (3) 2 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)
                   
State & Pop.Dens.                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 43 (43) 39 (37) 37 (35) 32 (30) 30 (28)
  20%-Categories 40 (40) 33 (30) 28 (25) 24 (21) 21 (19)
  15%-Categories 37 (37) 28 (25) 23 (20) 17 (15) 14 (12)
  10%-Categories 33 (33) 23 (20) 17 (14) 12 (10) 10 (8)
  5%-Categories 25 (25) 14 (11) 9 (7) 5 (4) 4 (3)
  1%-Categories 10 (10) 3 (2) 2 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)
               
 
 
Disclosure Risk of Geography Attributes - 33
 
Table 1 (cont.).  Average Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and Experimental 
Traits of Geography Attributes 
 Tract Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI
          
National (None)        
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 49,334 (49,334) 35,764 (32,211) 30,047 (26,346) 21,425 (18,806) 16,495 (13,988)
  20%-Categories 42,686 (42,686) 26,741 (22,477) 20,277 (16,235) 12,435 (10,304) 8,716 (6,835)
  15%-Categories 37,845 (37,845) 21,452 (17,298) 14,832 (11,178) 7,605 (6,049) 4,926 (3,640)
  10%-Categories 31,128 (31,128) 15,142 (11,557) 9,117 (6,332) 3,795 (2,944) 2,242 (1,536)
  5%-Categories 20,939 (20,939) 6,989 (4,800) 3,231 (1,883) 819 (557) 437 (217)
  1%-Categories 5,080 (5,080) 454 (273) 77 (29) 9 (4) 4 (1)
                   
Population Density                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 18,994 (18,994) 13,703 (12,402) 11,546 (10,186) 8,278 (7,338) 6,377 (5,496)
  20%-Categories 16,349 (16,349) 10,144 (8,558) 7,717 (6,220) 4,729 (3,940) 3,348 (2,652)
  15%-Categories 14,472 (14,472) 8,104 (6,573) 5,622 (4,288) 2,923 (2,342) 1,903 (1,425)
  10%-Categories 11,851 (11,851) 5,673 (4,361) 3,437 (2,437) 1,458 (1,141) 880 (610)
  5%-Categories 7,921 (7,921) 2,622 (1,826) 1,226 (741) 324 (226) 178 (92)
  1%-Categories 1,965 (1,965) 178 (112) 32 (13) 4 (2) 2 (1)
                   
Division                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 5,808 (5,808) 4,248 (3,837) 3,576 (3,149) 2,583 (2,279) 2,003 (1,709)
  20%-Categories 5,029 (5,029) 3,187 (2,688) 2,420 (1,952) 1,514 (1,265) 1,074 (850)
  15%-Categories 4,473 (4,473) 2,578 (2,092) 1,789 (1,364) 956 (772) 632 (477)
  10%-Categories 3,700 (3,700) 1,839 (1,414) 1,115 (785) 490 (385) 299 (209)
  5%-Categories 2,534 (2,534) 885 (612) 415 (245) 116 (80) 66 (34)
  1%-Categories 653 (653) 66 (39) 13 (6) 2 (2) 2 (1)
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Table 1 (cont.).  Average Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and Experimental 
Traits of Geography Attributes 
 Tract Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI
          
Division & Pop.Dens.                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 2,508 (2,508) 1,823 (1,656) 1,540 (1,365) 1,119 (995) 870 (754)
  20%-Categories 2,158 (2,158) 1,352 (1,147) 1,030 (837) 647 (544) 466 (373)
  15%-Categories 1,916 (1,916) 1,089 (891) 759 (588) 415 (338) 278 (213)
  10%-Categories 1,576 (1,576) 768 (597) 469 (339) 213 (169) 133 (95)
  5%-Categories 1,069 (1,069) 368 (260) 174 (108) 52 (37) 31 (17)
  1%-Categories 282 (282) 29 (18) 6 (3) 2 (1) 1 (1)
                   
State                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 1,229 (1,229) 897 (816) 760 (676) 557 (496) 431 (373)
  20%-Categories 1,057 (1,057) 662 (563) 506 (412) 321 (271) 227 (182)
  15%-Categories 938 (938) 533 (436) 373 (288) 204 (167) 135 (104)
  10%-Categories 774 (774) 378 (294) 232 (167) 106 (84) 66 (47)
  5%-Categories 530 (530) 183 (129) 87 (53) 26 (19) 16 (9)
  1%-Categories 140 (140) 15 (9) 4 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1)
                   
State & Pop.Dens.                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 657 (657) 475 (434) 404 (361) 296 (266) 229 (201)
  20%-Categories 561 (561) 345 (294) 264 (217) 167 (141) 119 (97)
  15%-Categories 497 (497) 276 (228) 193 (152) 107 (88) 72 (56)
  10%-Categories 406 (406) 193 (152) 118 (87) 55 (45) 35 (25)
  5%-Categories 275 (275) 93 (67) 44 (29) 14 (10) 9 (5)
  1%-Categories 73 (73) 8 (6) 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1)
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Table 1 (cont.).  Average Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and Experimental Traits 
of Geography Attributes 
 Blockgroup Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI 
              
National (None)            
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 154,293 (154,293) 110,025 (98,322) 88,607 (76,730) 61,535 (53,964) 48,423 (40,399) 
  20%-Categories 135,594 (135,594) 85,528 (72,070) 62,437 (49,998) 38,267 (31,961) 27,979 (21,707) 
  15%-Categories 119,547 (119,547) 67,310 (54,208) 44,637 (33,254) 22,512 (17,968) 14,943 (10,789) 
  10%-Categories 99,080 (99,080) 47,868 (36,850) 27,831 (19,201) 11,859 (9,214) 7,302 (4,856) 
  5%-Categories 66,936 (66,936) 22,128 (15,654) 9,980 (5,735) 2,853 (1,964) 1,468 (706) 
  1%-Categories 20,252 (20,252) 1,637 (1,044) 351 (89) 60 (15) 13 () 
                   
Population Density                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 57,682 (57,682) 40,867 (36,669) 33,051 (28,822) 23,019 (20,379) 18,012 (15,241) 
  20%-Categories 50,570 (50,570) 31,679 (26,836) 23,199 (18,752) 14,241 (11,983) 10,502 (8,262) 
  15%-Categories 44,483 (44,483) 24,791 (20,078) 16,466 (12,424) 8,395 (6,755) 5,605 (4,095) 
  10%-Categories 36,749 (36,749) 17,538 (13,596) 10,219 (7,186) 4,412 (3,462) 2,751 (1,858) 
  5%-Categories 24,663 (24,663) 8,087 (5,794) 3,657 (2,172) 1,070 (752) 560 (280) 
  1%-Categories 7,440 (7,440) 606 (399) 132 (38) 23 (7) 6 (1) 
                   
Division                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 17,630 (17,630) 12,657 (11,342) 10,223 (8,895) 7,182 (6,328) 5,662 (4,751) 
  20%-Categories 15,502 (15,502) 9,854 (8,330) 7,217 (5,818) 4,493 (3,776) 3,298 (2,578) 
  15%-Categories 13,710 (13,710) 7,806 (6,317) 5,201 (3,914) 2,708 (2,186) 1,813 (1,326) 
  10%-Categories 11,419 (11,419) 5,609 (4,340) 3,279 (2,288) 1,455 (1,140) 908 (611) 
  5%-Categories 7,810 (7,810) 2,669 (1,895) 1,220 (709) 377 (260) 198 (97) 
  1%-Categories 2,421 (2,421) 212 (134) 49 (12) 10 (3) 3 (1) 
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Table 1 (cont.).  Average Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and Experimental 
Traits of Geography Attributes 
 Blockgroup Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI
             
Division & Pop.Dens.                   
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 7,396 (7,396) 5,269 (4,744) 4,273 (3,747) 3,013 (2,677) 2,367 (2,014)
  20%-Categories 6,478 (6,478) 4,078 (3,469) 2,990 (2,436) 1,872 (1,585) 1,388 (1,102)
  15%-Categories 5,714 (5,714) 3,211 (2,617) 2,139 (1,634) 1,133 (922) 765 (568)
  10%-Categories 4,735 (4,735) 2,289 (1,788) 1,337 (955) 607 (482) 384 (264)
  5%-Categories 3,207 (3,207) 1,080 (780) 492 (298) 158 (111) 85 (44)
  1%-Categories 994 (994) 87 (58) 21 (6) 5 (2) 2 (1)
                   
State                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 3,595 (3,595) 2,572 (2,320) 2,093 (1,839) 1,488 (1,324) 1,170 (994)
  20%-Categories 3,140 (3,140) 1,973 (1,679) 1,449 (1,180) 910 (772) 668 (528)
  15%-Categories 2,772 (2,772) 1,555 (1,269) 1,038 (793) 550 (449) 369 (274)
  10%-Categories 2,303 (2,303) 1,112 (868) 651 (462) 296 (234) 186 (127)
  5%-Categories 1,572 (1,572) 528 (380) 242 (145) 79 (55) 42 (21)
  1%-Categories 492 (492) 44 (28) 11 (4) 3 (1) 1 (1)
                   
State & Pop.Dens.                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 1,889 (1,889) 1,335 (1,209) 1,089 (963) 772 (692) 600 (517)
  20%-Categories 1,640 (1,640) 1,013 (866) 742 (610) 464 (396) 342 (274)
  15%-Categories 1,442 (1,442) 792 (651) 526 (407) 280 (230) 189 (142)
  10%-Categories 1,189 (1,189) 559 (440) 324 (236) 149 (119) 95 (66)
  5%-Categories 799 (799) 261 (191) 118 (74) 39 (28) 22 (12)
  1%-Categories 247 (247) 22 (15) 6 (2) 2 (1) 1 (1)
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Table 1 (cont.).  Average Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and Experimental 
Traits of Geography Attributes 
                        
SOURCE. -- 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing   
NOTE. --  The upper-bound of the 95% confidence interval for the average number of look-alike geographic units is presented in 
parentheses.  This estimate is adjusted to account for the complex survey design of sampled variables sets. 
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Table 2.  Average Standardized Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and 
Experimental Traits of Geography Attributes 
 County Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI
          
National (None)        
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 2,782 (2,782) 2,383 (2,231) 2,224 (2,058) 1,761 (1,597) 1,607 (1,418)
  20%-Categories 2,485 (2,485) 1,867 (1,675) 1,551 (1,331) 1,143 (988) 933 (787)
  15%-Categories 2,218 (2,218) 1,494 (1,279) 1,163 (933) 714 (590) 516 (413)
  10%-Categories 1,921 (1,921) 1,177 (966) 810 (612) 435 (354) 296 (221)
  5%-Categories 1,397 (1,397) 592 (448) 325 (206) 119 (86) 68 (45)
  1%-Categories 408 (408) 54 (36) 15 (5) 2 (2) 1 (1)
                     
Population Density                   
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 1,406 (1,406) 1,226 (1,158) 1,135 (1,056) 923 (848) 858 (771)
  20%-Categories 1,262 (1,262) 971 (875) 805 (690) 619 (533) 512 (430)
  15%-Categories 1,133 (1,133) 784 (679) 613 (496) 396 (330) 289 (234)
  10%-Categories 987 (987) 620 (517) 432 (331) 251 (205) 174 (133)
  5%-Categories 731 (731) 323 (249) 183 (117) 74 (53) 43 (29)
  1%-Categories 237 (237) 33 (22) 10 (3) 2 (1) 1 (1)
                     
Division                   
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 390 (390) 341 (323) 320 (300) 265 (244) 243 (218)
  20%-Categories 353 (353) 278 (253) 235 (206) 183 (161) 156 (135)
  15%-Categories 320 (320) 229 (201) 182 (151) 124 (105) 96 (80)
  10%-Categories 282 (282) 185 (156) 132 (103) 82 (68) 60 (47)
  5%-Categories 211 (211) 102 (79) 59 (40) 26 (19) 17 (12)
  1%-Categories 67 (67) 12 (8) 4 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1)
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Table 2 (cont.).  Average Standardized Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and 
Experimental Traits of Geography Attributes 
 County Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI
          
Division & Pop.Dens.                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 217 (217) 194 (185) 181 (170) 155 (144) 145 (132)
  20%-Categories 198 (198) 161 (148) 137 (120) 112 (99) 98 (85)
  15%-Categories 181 (181) 135 (120) 108 (91) 78 (67) 62 (52)
  10%-Categories 161 (161) 110 (94) 80 (64) 54 (45) 41 (32)
  5%-Categories 122 (122) 62 (50) 38 (26) 18 (14) 12 (9)
  1%-Categories 43 (43) 8 (6) 3 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1)
                   
State                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 78 (78) 69 (65) 65 (62) 55 (51) 51 (46)
  20%-Categories 71 (71) 57 (52) 49 (43) 39 (35) 33 (29)
  15%-Categories 65 (65) 47 (42) 38 (32) 27 (23) 22 (18)
  10%-Categories 57 (57) 38 (33) 28 (23) 18 (15) 14 (11)
  5%-Categories 43 (43) 22 (18) 13 (10) 7 (5) 5 (4)
  1%-Categories 15 (15) 3 (3) 2 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)
                   
State & Pop.Dens.                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 43 (43) 39 (37) 37 (35) 32 (30) 30 (28)
  20%-Categories 40 (40) 33 (30) 28 (25) 24 (21) 21 (19)
  15%-Categories 37 (37) 28 (25) 23 (20) 17 (15) 14 (12)
  10%-Categories 33 (33) 23 (20) 17 (14) 12 (10) 10 (8)
  5%-Categories 25 (25) 14 (11) 9 (7) 5 (4) 4 (3)
  1%-Categories 10 (10) 3 (2) 2 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)
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Table 2 (cont.).  Average Standardized Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and 
Experimental Traits of Geography Attributes 
 Tract Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI
          
National (None)        
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 2,378 (2,378) 1,724 (1,553) 1,448 (1,270) 1,033 (906) 795 (674)
  20%-Categories 2,057 (2,057) 1,289 (1,083) 977 (783) 599 (497) 420 (329)
  15%-Categories 1,824 (1,824) 1,034 (834) 715 (539) 367 (292) 237 (175)
  10%-Categories 1,500 (1,500) 730 (557) 439 (305) 183 (142) 108 (74)
  5%-Categories 1,009 (1,009) 337 (231) 156 (91) 39 (27) 21 (10)
  1%-Categories 245 (245) 22 (13) 4 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0)
                     
Population Density                   
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 916 (916) 660 (598) 557 (491) 399 (354) 307 (265)
  20%-Categories 788 (788) 489 (412) 372 (300) 228 (190) 161 (128)
  15%-Categories 698 (698) 391 (317) 271 (207) 141 (113) 92 (69)
  10%-Categories 571 (571) 273 (210) 166 (117) 70 (55) 42 (29)
  5%-Categories 382 (382) 126 (88) 59 (36) 16 (11) 9 (4)
  1%-Categories 95 (95) 9 (5) 2 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0)
                     
Division                   
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 280 (280) 205 (185) 172 (152) 124 (110) 97 (82)
  20%-Categories 242 (242) 154 (130) 117 (94) 73 (61) 52 (41)
  15%-Categories 216 (216) 124 (101) 86 (66) 46 (37) 30 (23)
  10%-Categories 178 (178) 89 (68) 54 (38) 24 (19) 14 (10)
  5%-Categories 122 (122) 43 (30) 20 (12) 6 (4) 3 (2)
  1%-Categories 31 (31) 3 (2) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
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Table 2 (cont.).  Average Standardized Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and 
Experimental Traits of Geography Attributes 
 Tract Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI
          
Division & Pop.Dens.                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 121 (121) 88 (80) 74 (66) 54 (48) 42 (36)
  20%-Categories 104 (104) 65 (55) 50 (40) 31 (26) 22 (18)
  15%-Categories 92 (92) 52 (43) 37 (28) 20 (16) 13 (10)
  10%-Categories 76 (76) 37 (29) 23 (16) 10 (8) 6 (5)
  5%-Categories 52 (52) 18 (13) 8 (5) 3 (2) 1 (1)
  1%-Categories 14 (14) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
                   
State                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 59 (59) 43 (39) 37 (33) 27 (24) 21 (18)
  20%-Categories 51 (51) 32 (27) 24 (20) 15 (13) 11 (9)
  15%-Categories 45 (45) 26 (21) 18 (14) 10 (8) 7 (5)
  10%-Categories 37 (37) 18 (14) 11 (8) 5 (4) 3 (2)
  5%-Categories 26 (26) 9 (6) 4 (3) 1 (1) 1 (0)
  1%-Categories 7 (7) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
                   
State & Pop.Dens.                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 32 (32) 23 (21) 19 (17) 14 (13) 11 (10)
  20%-Categories 27 (27) 17 (14) 13 (10) 8 (7) 6 (5)
  15%-Categories 24 (24) 13 (11) 9 (7) 5 (4) 3 (3)
  10%-Categories 20 (20) 9 (7) 6 (4) 3 (2) 2 (1)
  5%-Categories 13 (13) 4 (3) 2 (1) 1 (1) 0 (0)
  1%-Categories 4 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
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Table 2 (cont.).  Average Standardized Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and 
Experimental Traits of Geography Attributes 
 Blockgroup Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI 
              
National (None)            
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 2,330 (2,330) 1,661 (1,485) 1,338 (1,159) 929 (815) 731 (610) 
  20%-Categories 2,047 (2,047) 1,291 (1,088) 943 (755) 578 (483) 422 (328) 
  15%-Categories 1,805 (1,805) 1,016 (819) 674 (502) 340 (271) 226 (163) 
  10%-Categories 1,496 (1,496) 723 (556) 420 (290) 179 (139) 110 (73) 
  5%-Categories 1,011 (1,011) 334 (236) 151 (87) 43 (30) 22 (11) 
  1%-Categories 306 (306) 25 (16) 5 (1) 1 (0) 0 (0) 
                     
Population Density                   
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 871 (871) 617 (554) 499 (435) 348 (308) 272 (230) 
  20%-Categories 764 (764) 478 (405) 350 (283) 215 (181) 159 (125) 
  15%-Categories 672 (672) 374 (303) 249 (188) 127 (102) 85 (62) 
  10%-Categories 555 (555) 265 (205) 154 (109) 67 (52) 42 (28) 
  5%-Categories 372 (372) 122 (87) 55 (33) 16 (11) 8 (4) 
  1%-Categories 112 (112) 9 (6) 2 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
                     
Division                   
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 266 (266) 191 (171) 154 (134) 108 (96) 85 (72) 
  20%-Categories 234 (234) 149 (126) 109 (88) 68 (57) 50 (39) 
  15%-Categories 207 (207) 118 (95) 79 (59) 41 (33) 27 (20) 
  10%-Categories 172 (172) 85 (66) 50 (35) 22 (17) 14 (9) 
  5%-Categories 118 (118) 40 (29) 18 (11) 6 (4) 3 (1) 
  1%-Categories 37 (37) 3 (2) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
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Table 2 (cont.).  Average Standardized Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and 
Experimental Traits of Geography Attributes 
 Blockgroup Attributes 
  
1-Key 2-Keys 3-Keys 4-Keys 5-Keys 
Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI Number 95% CI
             
Division & Pop.Dens.                   
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 112 (112) 80 (72) 65 (57) 45 (40) 36 (30)
  20%-Categories 98 (98) 62 (52) 45 (37) 28 (24) 21 (17)
  15%-Categories 86 (86) 48 (40) 32 (25) 17 (14) 12 (9)
  10%-Categories 72 (72) 35 (27) 20 (14) 9 (7) 6 (4)
  5%-Categories 48 (48) 16 (12) 7 (5) 2 (2) 1 (1)
  1%-Categories 15 (15) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
                   
State                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 54 (54) 39 (35) 32 (28) 22 (20) 18 (15)
  20%-Categories 47 (47) 30 (25) 22 (18) 14 (12) 10 (8)
  15%-Categories 42 (42) 23 (19) 16 (12) 8 (7) 6 (4)
  10%-Categories 35 (35) 17 (13) 10 (7) 4 (4) 3 (2)
  5%-Categories 24 (24) 8 (6) 4 (2) 1 (1) 1 (0)
  1%-Categories 7 (7) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
                   
State & Pop.Dens.                 
  Top, Bot-25%, Oth 29 (29) 20 (18) 16 (15) 12 (10) 9 (8)
  20%-Categories 25 (25) 15 (13) 11 (9) 7 (6) 5 (4)
  15%-Categories 22 (22) 12 (10) 8 (6) 4 (3) 3 (2)
  10%-Categories 18 (18) 8 (7) 5 (4) 2 (2) 1 (1)
  5%-Categories 12 (12) 4 (3) 2 (1) 1 (0) 0 (0)
  1%-Categories 4 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
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Table 2 (cont.).  Average Standardized Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units for Respondent Locations, By Spatial Scale and 
Experimental Traits of Geography Attributes 
                        
SOURCE. -- 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing   
NOTE. --  The upper-bound of the 95% confidence interval for the Average Standardized Number of look-alike geographic units is 
presented in parentheses.  This estimate is adjusted to account for the complex survey design of sampled variables sets. 
NOTE. --  Geography population counts for tracts and blockgroups (presented in Table 1) are multiplied by 0.0482 and 0.0151 
respectively, such that these estimates are benchmarked to county-level counts. 
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Figure 1.  Scope of Study and Reductions in Full Intruder Search Effort
Population Density
Division
Division & Pop. Density
State
State & Pop. Density
( - 0.63 )
( - 0.88 )
( - 0.95 )
( - 0.97 )
( - 0.99 )
( - 0.95 )
( - 0.98 )
( - 0.99 )









Absolute and Proportional Change in 
Standardized Number of Look-Alike Geographic Units
( - 0.32 )
( - 0.43 )
( - 0.68 )
( - 0.61 )
( - 0.45 )


















( - 0.58 )
( - 0.44 )
( - 0.61 )
( - 0.75 )
( - 0.82 )
( - 0.77 )










Absolute and Proportional Change in 










































































Division Division & Population Density State
